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Abstract
The standard expected utility (EUT) model of tax evasion predicts that evasion is
decreasing in the marginal tax rate (the Yitzhaki puzzle). Recent literature shows cases
in which incorporating prospect theory (PT) does and does not overturn the Puzzle. In
a general environment that nests both PT and EUT preferences, we provide a detailed
study of how the elements of PT affect the Puzzle. PT does not always reverse the
Puzzle, hence we give and interpret conditions for when it does and does not. When
allowing for stigma and/or variable audit probability, PT reverses the Puzzle in the
same way and with the same limitations as does EUT, if equally augmented.
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1 Introduction
The Expected Utility Theory (EUT) model of tax evasion predicts a negative relationship
between tax rates and evasion whenever fines are imposed on the evaded tax and taxpayers
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (Yitzhaki 1974). Although empirical evidence on
this question is mixed, and depends to an extent on the econometric methodology used
(Bernasconi et al. 2014), a substantial body of empirical and experimental evidence finds
a positive relationship between evasion and the tax rate (see, e.g., Ali et al. 2001; Alm et
al. 1995; Clotfelter 1983; Crane and Nourzad 1986; Friedland et al. 1978; Pommerehne and
Weck-Hannemann 1996; Poterba 1987).1 Owing to the weight of contradicting empirical
evidence, and its counter-intuitive nature, the negative relationship between tax rates and
evasion predicted by the EUT model has sometimes been termed the “Yitzhaki paradox” or
“Yitzhaki puzzle”.
Prospect Theory (PT) has become a centrepiece of behavioural economics, for it is able to
resolve many puzzles associated with EUT and it provides a better fit to much empirical data
(Bruhin et al. 2010).2 It remains disputed, however, whether the application of PT to tax
evasion resolves the Yitzhaki puzzle: Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007) and Yaniv (1999), among others, each illustrate a specification of PT that resolves the
Yitzhaki puzzle, but Hashimzade et al. (2013: 16) show alternative specifications that do not.
Unpicking these divergent results is far from straightforward, however, as the elements of PT
are specified differently across studies and as some studies invoke auxiliary assumptions (in
addition to those of PT). Hashimzade et al. (2013) do consider some general specifications
of PT, but do not directly compare to other preference models, while Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007) undertake a comparison of PT and EUT, but not in a unified framework that nests
EUT and PT, and for only one specification of PT. In this paper, therefore, we seek to
evaluate, in a general sense, the marginal contribution of the elements of PT – individually
and collectively – towards resolving the Yitzhaki puzzle. By disentangling the separate
driving forces, we are able to reconcile seemingly contradictory results in the literature and
to clarify which of the elements of PT, if any, contribute to solving the Puzzle. As these
elements are now widely applied in the broader literature on behavioural decision making,
1See Feinstein (1991), however, for evidence consistent with a negative relationship.
2PT was initially proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and subsequently extended to “cumulative”
PT by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). In this study we use cumulative PT, but our main qualitative
conclusions apply also to the original version of PT. See, e.g., Barberis (2013) and Camerer (2000) for
reviews of applications of PT other than to tax evasion.
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by isolating the different components, our results can be readily extended to many further
behavioural models besides PT.
We perform our evaluation in a general environment – which we shall term the Taxpayer
Behavioural Model (TBM) – in which it is possible to vary (i) the specification of reference
income; (ii) the elements of PT that are assumed to hold – to separate out the distinct effects
of reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion, and probability weighting;
and (iii) the auxiliary assumptions assumed to hold vis-a`-vis those of the standard portfolio
model of tax compliance. The TBM is sufficiently general to encompass much of the existing
literature, but sufficiently specific to yield conditions with clear economic and psychological
interpretation.3
Our first contribution is to show that several seemingly disparate approaches to the
specification of reference income in the existing literature are variants of a simple, yet general,
formulation. Within this general formulation, our two main results are as follows: first,
matching Yitzhaki’s original demonstration of the Puzzle under EUT, we give apparently
plausible conditions under which the Puzzle still holds under PT (and stripped-down vari-
ants). Second, we find that, although some specifications of PT do reverse the Puzzle, such
reversals often rely on the psychologically questionable implication that a tax rise makes
taxpayers feel subjectively richer (relative to reference income) in the not-caught state, and
in expectation. In particular, for PT to resolve the Puzzle, this condition must hold when
preferences are homogeneous, a common assumption in applications of PT. Thus, while our
results do not necessarily endorse the descriptive validity of EUT, we find nonetheless that
a set of specifications of PT – which includes many specifications proposed in the literature
– are either psychologically questionable, or share similar descriptive deficiencies in respect
of the Puzzle.
We examine the implications for both EUT and PT (among other variants) of allowing
for two auxiliary assumptions: social stigma costs and a variable audit probability. Allowing
for sufficient social stigma always resolves the Puzzle under EUT, but not always under PT.
In contrast, allowing for a variable audit probability does not clearly improve the ability
3Among others, the TBM allows us to treat as special cases the models developed in Bernasconi and
Zanardi (2004), Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) and two cases described in Hashimzade et al. (2013). Our
model can be used to reconcile the apparently contradictory results therein. Although we have strived for
widespread applicability, the TBM does not exhaustively encompass the literature. In particular, Rablen
(2010) introduces PT into a version of the tax evasion model that allows for taxes to fund the provision of
a public good (which we do not consider here). Also, Bernasconi et al. (2014) allow for reference income to
adapt over time to changes in the tax rate. These authors show that their model predicts an upward drift
in tax evasion (after an initial fall), following an increase in the tax rate.
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of either EUT or PT to resolve the Puzzle. In general, the conditions under which these
auxiliary assumptions improve the predictions of PT with respect to the Puzzle are the same
as those which also improve the predictions of EUT.
By allowing for stripped-down variants of PT we observe the marginal contribution of
each of its elements. Under PT preferences reference dependence is necessary to overturn the
Yitzhaki puzzle, but the remaining PT elements – diminishing sensitivity, loss aversion and
probability weighting – are neither necessary nor sufficient. These findings seem consistent
with the nascent literature on the relative economic importance of the PT elements –
reference dependence being the most widely accepted (see, e.g., Barberis 2013; Santos-Pinto
et al. 2015).
The results of this study contribute to the literature on the use of non-expected utility
preferences (and PT in particular) to explain tax evasion, and to the wider literature on the
descriptive usefulness of non-expected utility preferences (Kim 2005; Harrison and Rutstro¨m
2009; Bruhin et al. 2010; Isoni 2011; Rees-Jones 2014; Masatlioglu and Raymond 2016).
We do not claim that EUT is descriptively superior or inferior to PT over the full gamut of
empirical regularities on tax-related behaviour, and other evidence relating to behaviour in
risky settings more generally. Our results do, though, lead us to question the claim that PT
is inherently better able to reconcile the Yitzhaki puzzle than is EUT.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a general model of
the tax evasion decision that nests both PT and EUT preferences. In section 3 we analyse
the model for a fixed audit probability, and then for a variable audit probability. Section 4
concludes with a discussion of our findings and some wider thoughts on the choice of reference
income and of preferences in applications of PT to tax evasion. All proofs are given in the
Appendix.
2 Taxpayer Behavioural Model
We now present a general model of the taxpayer tax evasion decision – the Taxpayer
Behavioural Model – which nests PT, EUT and intermediate variants that may be considered
as stripped-down versions of PT. Consider a taxpayer with an exogenous taxable income
Y > 0 (which is known to the taxpayer but not to the tax authority).4 The government
4Following the study of Kleven et al. (2011) – who show that the descriptive validity of the EUT model
is improved when allowing for plausible levels of third-party reporting – it is now common to interpret
Y not as a taxpayer’s full income, but as that part of income not subject to third-party reporting. As
this interpretation is not adopted, however, in the literature we address, we do not formally adopt this
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levies a proportional income tax at marginal rate t ∈ (0, 1) on declared income X ∈ (0, Y ).
The probability of audit is given by p = p (X) ∈ (0, 1) with p′ ≤ 0, though taxpayers
may behave as if they transform this objective probability into a decision weight w (p),
where w (0) = 0, w (1) = 1 and w′ > 0.5 In the special case p′ = 0 the probability of
audit is independent, or “exogenous”, of declared income. Audited taxpayers face a fine at
rate f ∈ (1, t−1) on all undeclared tax, where the upper bound ensures that the amount
paid (tax plus fines) never exceeds a taxpayer’s total income (hence limited liability is never
violated, regardless of earned and declared income). Following Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007),
taxpayers may additionally incur social stigma equivalent to a monetary cost s [Y −X],
where s ≥ 0. Accordingly, Y n ≡ Y − tX is the taxpayer’s income when not caught, and
Y c ≡ Y n − [tf + s] [Y −X] is the taxpayer’s income when caught (audited).
The carrier of utility, v, is constructed to be sufficiently general to nest both EUT and
PT preferences. Specifically, we first define a function u : R 7→ R satisfying
A0. u (x) is continuous and twice differentiable for all x ∈ R, except possibly at x = 0.
A1. u (0) = 0;
A2. u′ > 0;
A3. u′′ < 0;
A4. ∂Au (x) /∂x ≤ 0, where Au (x) ≡ −u′′ (x) /u′ (x).6
The carrier of utility, v, is then defined as
v (x) =
{
u (x) if x ≥ 0;
[−1]DS λu
(
[−1]DS x
)
otherwise;
(1)
where λ ≥ 1, and the condition DS is true (DS = 1) when diminishing sensitivity is assumed
to hold, and false otherwise (DS = 0). Note, first, that setting DS = 0 and λ = 1 we have
v (x) = u (x) as under EUT. In this case A2 and A3 imply that v is increasing and concave.
A4 implies that absolute risk aversion with respect to v is decreasing, although we note that
interpretation.
5Hence, the objective probability distribution is {p, 1− p} and the transformed probability distribution is
{w (p) , 1− w (p)}. PT allows for different weighting functions to apply to outcomes that fall above or below
the reference level. As pointed out by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) and Prelec (1998), however, empirically
the same weighting function is found to apply above and below the reference level, so we assume there to be
a single weighting function w. The assumption p′ ≤ 0 is consistent with the literature on optimal auditing
(e.g., Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Piolatto and Trotin 2016).
6An example of a function satisfying A0-A4 is u (x) = x− e−bx with b > 0. See Bell and Fishburn (2000)
for an axiomatisation of functions of this type.
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for w (p) 6= p risk preferences (in the sense of preferences for mean-preserving spreads) are
determined jointly with respect to v and to w (Schmidt and Zank 2008).7 Note, second,
that under diminishing sensitivity utility becomes v (x) = −λu (−x) for x < 0. In this case
A2 still implies that v is monotonic, but A3 implies that v is convex for x < 0. Following
Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005), loss aversion with respect to v requires limx↑0 ∂v(x)/∂x >
limx↓0 ∂v(x)/∂x, which holds if and only if λ > 1. Assumption A4 implies with respect to v
that
A (x) ≡ Av (x) ≡ −v
′′ (x)
v′ (x)
{
< 0 if x < 0, DS = 1;
> 0 otherwise.
Taxpayers are assumed to judge outcomes relative to a reference level of income R – the
reference-dependence element of PT. Thus we write ∆Y i ≡ Y i − R, i = c, n. We employ
a specification of reference income that we shall show is sufficiently general to nest a wide
range of those proposed in the existing literature. The underlying observation informing our
specification is that existing approaches can be understood as weighted averages of wealth
in the caught and not-caught states. Specifically, we write
R = α (·)Y c + [1− α (·)]Y n, (2)
where the function α (·) satisfies
A5. α (·) = φ1 + φ2Y−X ,
and φ1 (·) and φ2 (·) are real-valued functions satisfying φ1X = φ2X = 0 (where φiX ≡
∂φi (·) /∂X). For future reference, we denote the elasticity of φi with respect to t as εφi,t.
The specifications of reference income in the existing literature that are special cases of
A5 are listed in Table 1. R = 0, as under EUT, is the special case of A5 obtained by
setting φ1 = t/ [ft+ s] and φ2 = Y [1− t] / [ft+ s]. Alternatively, setting φ1 = t/ [ft+ s]
and φ2 = 0, we obtain the taxpayer’s post-tax income if s/he does not evade (the legal
post-tax income): R = Y [1− t]. This specification for reference income was first proposed
by Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007). It is also considered in Trotin (2012), and is one of the
examples in Hashimzade et al. (2013). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) make a general argument
that the reference level should reflect the expected outcome of the lottery. Consistent with
such approaches, reference income is equated to the expected value of the gamble by setting
φ1 = w (p) and φ2 = 0. Hashimzade et al. (2013) also consider the specification R = X [1− t]
7These properties continue to hold if λ > 1, the only difference between cases being that, if λ > 1 then,
even if u (x) is differentiable at x = 0, v (x) is not differentiable at x = 0.
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as one of their examples, which obtains from A5 with φ1 = 1/ [ft+ s], and φ2 = 0. The
specification of Yaniv (1999) exercises fully the generality of A5, for it implies φ2 6= 0. The
as yet undefined notation in Table 1 required to characterise Yaniv’s specification we shall
detail later.
R φ1 φ2
Constant (= c) t
ft+s
Y [1−t]−c
ft+s
Y [1− t] t
ft+s
0
X [1− t] 1
ft+s
0
Exp. val. w (p) 0
Yaniv (1999) t
ft+s
t[ωb−Y ]
ft+s
Table 1: Characterising specifications of reference income in the literature
Taxpayers are assumed to choose X to maximise
V = w (p) v (∆Y c) + [1− w (p)] v (∆Y n) , (3)
where, under A5,
∆Y n = [ft+ s] [φ1 [Y −X] + φ2] ; ∆Y c = [ft+ s] [[φ1 − 1] [Y −X] + φ2] .
Table 2 introduces four variants of the TBM, each of which may be considered with or
without social stigma, and under either p′ = 0 or p′ < 0. These are only four of many
possible variants, but are sufficient to make our key observations.
Variant R Diminishing Sensitivity Loss Aversion Probability Weighting
EUT 0 No No No
LA ∧ PW 0 No Yes Yes
RD ∈ (Y c, Y n) No Yes Yes
PT ∈ (Y c, Y n) Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Variants of the TBM
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The simplest variant is EUT. To understand the marginal contribution of loss aversion
and probability weighting, these features are introduced in the LA ∧ PW variant. We
introduce these together as it shall transpire that neither is important for the predictions
of the TBM with respect to the Puzzle. Reference-dependence is introduced in variant RD,
while the last variant, PT , satisfies the assumptions of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky
and Kahneman 1992). As is widely noted, under diminishing sensitivity an interior maximum
to (3) must satisfy ∆Y n > 0 for p′′ sufficiently small, for otherwise the taxpayer’s objective
function is globally convex. Moreover, if ∆Y c > 0, then the predictions of the PT variant
are identical to those of the RD variant. Hence, under PT we assume ∆Y c < 0 < ∆Y n,
and we retain this assumption in the RD variant to isolate the marginal effect of allowing
for diminishing sensitivity. As the most parsimonious of the variants, EUT is at an inherent
disadvantage relative to the remaining variants in respect of predicting empirical phenomena.
This observation would make any failure of PT to outperform EUT the more surprising.
As we shall now go on to demonstrate, these four variants of the TBM are consistent with
special cases of A5.
Differentiating with respect to X we obtain the first and second derivatives of (3) as
∂V
∂X
= [ft+ s] [w (p) [1− φ1] v′ (∆Y c)− [1− w (p)]φ1v′ (∆Y n)]
− p′w′ [v (∆Y n)− v (∆Y c)] ; (4)
∂2V
[∂X]2
≡ D = [ft+ s]2 [w (p) [1− φ1]2 v′′ (∆Y c) + [1− w (p)] [φ1]2 v′′ (∆Y n)]
+ 2 [ft+ s] p′w′ [[1− φ1] v′ (∆Y c) + φ1v′ (∆Y n)]
−
[
p′′w′ + [p′]2w′′
]
[v (∆Y n)− v (∆Y c)] . (5)
Sufficient conditions for a (global) interior maximum with respect to equations (4) and (5)
are ∂V/∂X = 0 and the second derivative D < 0 for all X. Under diminishing sensitivity
the second order condition (D < 0) – implying that the objective function is concave in X –
cannot be guaranteed for any easily interpretable restriction on the parameters. Moreover,
under diminishing sensitivity it is possible – because of the possibility of corner solutions –
that the first and second order conditions do not describe the solution of the maximisation
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problem.8 As these difficulties of PT are well understood, we choose to set them aside here.
Henceforth, when analysing the TBM under diminishing sensitivity, we proceed under the
maintained assumption that the second derivative in (5) is negative, such that indeed the
first order condition describes a unique choice for the taxpayer on the interval X ∈ (0, Y ).9
A6. D < 0 for all X.
If φ1 is decreasing in stigma (φ1s < 0), as is the case for all the specifications of reference
income in Table 1, then the restriction to interior solutions for evasion places an upper bound
s < s on the level of stigma. We prove the following Lemma, which extends Dhami and
al-Nowaihi’s Proposition 5:
Lemma 1 If φ1s < 0 then, at any interior maximum of (3), it must hold that s < s, where
s is the unique s such that
φ1 (s) =
{
limX↑Y
λw(p(X))
1+[λ−1]w(p(X)) if φ2 = 0;
limX↑Y w (p (X)) otherwise.
3 Analysis
3.1 Exogenous Audit Probability
In this section we examine the four variants of the TBM given in Table 2 under one further
assumption regarding the probability of audit:
A7. p′ = 0,
which is equivalent to the assumption of random auditing. As we restrict our attention to
interior maxima, and several variants in Table 2 additionally require ∆Y c < 0 < ∆Y n, we
establish the conditions under which each of these restrictions is satisfied:
Lemma 2 Under A0-A7,
(i) at any interior maximum of (3), it must hold that φ1 ∈ (0, 1);
(ii) ∆Y c < 0 < ∆Y n always holds at an interior maximum of (3) if and only if φ2 = 0.
8Local maxima may also arise, so the first-order condition may not possess a unique solution. See
Hashimzade et al. (2013) for a detailed discussion of these difficulties.
9We do not investigate the properties of the corner solutions X ∈ {0, Y }, for the descriptive validity of
tax evasion as an all-or-nothing activity appears weak.
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Part (ii) of Lemma 2 weakens the conditions for an interior maximum to exist given in
Proposition 3 of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
Proposition 1 If assumptions A0-A7 hold then, at an interior maximum,
(i) under both EUT and LA ∧ PW , ∂X
∂t
≥ 0 for s sufficiently close to (or equal to) zero
and ∂X
∂t
< 0 for s sufficiently close to s;
(ii) under RD there exists a Φ(ii) > 0 such that
∂X
∂t
R 0⇔ φ1t Q Φ(ii);
(iii) under PT there exists a critical value of φ1t, Φ(iii), which may be positive or negative,
around which ∂X
∂t
switches sign. For s sufficiently close to s (or for φ1 sufficiently close
to zero), ∂X
∂t
R 0⇔ φ1t Q Φ(iii) > Φ(ii);
(iv) under both PT and RD, ∂X
∂t
≥ 0 for φ1t sufficiently close to (or equal to) zero;
(v) under PT with φ1t = 0 there exists a Φ(v) > − tftf+s such that ∂X∂t R 0⇔ εφ2,t Q Φ(v).
Part (i) of Proposition 1 begins by extending Yitzhaki’s (1974) statement of the Puzzle –
which implicitly assumes λ = 1, s = 0 and w (p) = p – to allow for loss aversion, probability
weighting and for sufficiently low levels of stigma. The finding in part (i) is a pure income
effect: there is no substitution effect as both the tax rate and the penalty rate increase
proportionally with t. The income effect generated by an increase in t can itself be considered
in two parts. The first part, IEφ, is the part of the income effect arising from movements
in R through {φ1, φ2}; and the second part, IE−φ, is the remainder of the effect – arising
directly from movements in t and from the equilibrium adjustments of X. IE−φ always
increases the optimal declaration following a tax rate rise at an interior maximum, whereas
IEφ under both EUT and LA ∧ PW is zero; hence the Yitzhaki puzzle.
There are two elements of PT that can reverse the above intuition. Reference-dependence
can reverse the Puzzle if it makes taxpayers feel richer in expectation, rather than poorer,
following an increase in the tax rate. To make these concepts precise, we define the expected
absolute wealth of a taxpayer as E (Y ) ≡ w (p)Y c + [1− w (p)]Y n and the expected relative
wealth (when wealth is measured relative to the reference level R) as E (∆Y ) ≡ w (p) ∆Y c+
[1− w (p)] ∆Y n. We write that taxpayers “feel richer in expectation” when E (∆Y ) increases.
Taxpayers can be expected to be left poorer in absolute terms from a tax rate rise,
even after accounting for equilibrium adjustments in X. The only possible exception is the
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(seemingly unlikely) case in which the government operates at a tax rate on the “wrong” side
of a Laffer curve relationship for expected revenue (whereby ∂X/∂t is sufficiently negative
that also ∂ [tX] /∂t < 0, such that taxpayers pay less tax following a tax rate rise).10 Under
EUT we have R = 0 so when taxpayers are made poorer in absolute terms from a tax rate
rise, they are also poorer in relative terms. Yet, under reference-dependence, it is possible for
an increase in the tax rate to make taxpayers feel richer in relative terms, even when they
are made poorer in absolute terms, if reference income falls faster with the tax rate than
does post-tax income. When taxpayers feel richer following a tax rate rise, the income effect
drives declared income down, rather than up, creating an opening to resolve the Puzzle (the
RD effect). Under what conditions will an increase in the tax rate result in expected relative
income, E (∆Y ), (and relative income in the not-caught state, ∆Y n) increasing too? We
now show that the answer to this question is regulated by the sign of φ1t. In the following
Lemma we write “d” rather than the partial derivative symbol “∂” to emphasise that here
we consider the “full” effect of a change in t, including that arising from any equilibrium
adjustment in X.
Lemma 3 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1 it holds that
(i) Under RD d[E(∆Y )]
dt
R 0⇔ d[∆Y n]
dt
R 0⇔ φ1t R 0;
(ii) Under PT the sign of d[E(∆Y )]
dt
and d[∆Y
n]
dt
switch around φ1t = 0. For s sufficiently
close to s, d[E(∆Y )]
dt
R 0⇔ d[∆Y n]
dt
R 0⇔ φ1t R 0.
With Lemma 3 in hand, it is straightforward to interpret part (ii) of Proposition 1, which
states that a necessary condition for the RD variant to reverse the Puzzle is that φ1t > 0. By
part (i) of Lemma 3, this condition is equivalent to the statement that a tax rate rise makes
taxpayers feel richer in expectation. As a sufficient condition to reverse the Puzzle, φ1t must
not just be positive, but sufficiently so in order to overcome an offsetting substitution effect.
How plausible is the necessary assumption that taxpayers feel richer in the not-caught state,
and in expectation, following a tax rate rise? Barring the Laffer curve consideration given
above, the taxpayer – judged in absolute terms – is poorer in expectation following a tax
rate increase, in which case the RD-effect relies on a strong disjunction between the response
10Fisman and Wei (2004) empirically document an instance in which tax evasion indeed leads to a Laffer
curve relationship holding. Clearly, however, were the government operating on the wrong side of a Laffer
curve, it is unclear why it would ever wish to further increase the tax rate.
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to a tax rate rise of absolute and relative income to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. Although
we know of no direct empirical evidence on this point, we find the idea that taxpayers made
poorer in absolute terms would also feel poorer (i.e., d [E (Y )] /dt < 0⇒ d [E (∆Y )] /dt < 0)
compelling from a psychological perspective.
The second element of PT that can reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle is diminishing sensitivity:
this can overturn the Puzzle by reversing the sign of the income effect in the caught state, so
that when a taxpayer feels poorer in the caught state, they are induced to take more (not less)
risk, and thus declare less income (the DS-effect). Note, however, that whereas the RD-effect
requires that a tax rate rise makes taxpayers feel richer, the DS-effect requires that a tax rate
rise makes taxpayers feel poorer. Equivalently, reference-dependence requires reference in-
come to be sensitive to the tax rate to resolve the Puzzle, but diminishing sensitivity requires
reference income to be insensitive to the tax rate. The effects of reference-dependence and
diminishing sensitivity with respect to the Puzzle oppose each other, therefore. Accordingly,
part (ii) of Lemma 3 implies that an increase in φ1t (which makes reference income more
sensitive to the tax rate) can either increase or decrease the effect of a tax rate rise on
expected income depending on the balance of the DS- and RD-effects. It is this ambiguity
that lies at the heart of part (iii) of Proposition 1, which gives the condition needed for the
DS-effect to reverse the Puzzle.
Part (iv) of the Proposition exploits the observation that the RD- and DS-effects are
in opposition to establish a simple and relevant condition under which the Yitzhaki puzzle
unambiguously holds. It states that when the expected value of the gamble moves sufficiently
little with the tax rate (φ1t close to zero) the Yitzhaki puzzle holds under both the PT and
RD variants. In this case taxpayers neither feel sufficiently richer after a tax rate rise for the
RD-effect to overturn the Puzzle, nor feel sufficiently poorer for the DS-effect to overturn
the Puzzle.
How does introducing stigma mediate the above findings? Part (i) of Proposition 1 states
that the Yitzhaki puzzle is always resolved under EUT for s sufficiently high. This finding is
consistent with various analyses incorporating stigma – differing in the way in which stigma
enters the taxpayer’s objective function – that establish bounds for s above which ∂X/∂t < 0
(al-Nowaihi and Pyle 2000; Dell’Anno 2009; Gordon 1989; Kim 2003). In contrast, even in
the neighbourhood of the maximum level of stigma, the Puzzle is not unambiguously reversed
in either the PT or RD variants. Rather, close to the maximum level of stigma, part (iii)
of Proposition 1 states that the same questionable necessary condition for reversing the
Yitzhaki puzzle under the RD variant holds also under PT : taxpayers must feel richer in the
11
not caught state, and in expectation, after an increase in the tax rate (and, as a necessary
condition, this effect must be sufficiently strong).
3.1.1 Implications for the literature
We now consider the implications of our findings for the existing literature. We first consider
those specifications of reference income given in Table 1 that satisfy R ∈ (Y c, Y n). To begin,
we consider these specifications in the absence of stigma (s = 0). In this case the specification
of reference income as the taxpayer’s legal post-tax income, R = Y [1− t], implies φ1 = f−1,
and the specification as the expected value of the tax gamble implies φ1 = w (p). It is
readily observed that, for both specifications, φ1t = 0, thus (by part (iv) of Proposition 1)
the Yitzhaki puzzle holds both under the PT and RD variants.11 Only for the specification
of reference income R = X [1− t] examined in Hashimzade et al. (2013) does part (iv)
of Proposition 1 not apply, for it implies φ1 = [ft]
−1, hence φ1t = − [ft2]−1 < 0. In this
case the Yitzhaki puzzle holds under RD, but the sign of ∂X/∂t is not determined a-priori
under PT. Thus for two of the three specifications of reference income in the literature
satisfying R ∈ (Y c, Y n) – including the most utilised specification of reference income as
the taxpayer’s legal post-tax income – neither PT nor its stripped-down variants resolve the
Yitzhaki puzzle. Note that, for these two specifications that do not resolve the Puzzle, the
ability of the PT and RD variants to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle is strictly weaker than
that of EUT. The latter can always reverse the Puzzle, albeit by invoking the empirically
unsatisfactory assumption of increasing absolute risk aversion (and this must be sufficiently
strong), whereas PT and its variants cannot reverse the Puzzle for any choice of preferences
consistent with an interior maximum.
Allowing for stigma yields mixed findings. For the specification of reference income as
legal post-tax income the predictions of the PT and RD variants are improved, for we
obtain φ1t = s/ [ft+ s]
2 > 0, such that the sign of ∂X/∂t becomes ambiguous in general,
but unambiguously negative for s close to s. This reversal as s ↑ s relies, however, on a tax
rate rise making taxpayers feel richer (φ1t > 0). The predictions for ∂X/∂t are unchanged
for the specification of reference income as the expected value of the gamble, however, and
for the specification R = X [1− t] they worsen: in the absence of stigma this specification
implies an ambiguous sign for ∂X/∂t under PT, but unambiguously implies Yitzhaki’s puzzle
11Trotin (2012) uses the taxpayer’s legal post-tax income to specify reference income in a model without
stigma and claims (her Proposition 8) to resolve the Yitzhaki puzzle. The difference between our findings
and hers is attributable to a non sequitur in her proof of Proposition 8. In particular, we are unable to
replicate the expression for ∂ΦR (x
∗, t) /∂t in the first line of her proof.
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for s close to s. In summary, augmenting EUT with stigma unambiguously improves its
descriptive abilities, for it always overturns the Yitzhaki puzzle if enough stigma is allowed
for. Augmenting PT with stigma sharpens its predictions with respect to the Yitzhaki puzzle,
but does not unambiguously improve their descriptive validity. In particular, for either the
PT or RD variants to overturn the Puzzle, even close to the maximum level of stigma, an
increase in the tax rate must make taxpayers feel richer in expectation.
Proposition 1 connects to two further studies in the existing literature: Yaniv (1999) and
Bernasconi and Zanardi (2004), each of which employs a specification of reference income that
does not always satisfy R ∈ (Y c, Y n). Specifically, Yaniv examines a model with reference
income specified as R = Y − H, where H is the amount of an advance tax payment. The
advance payment H is specified (up to a constant) as H = ωtb where b is the tax authority’s
estimate of the taxpayer’s income (which could under- or over-estimate the true Y ), and
ω ∈ [0, 1]. This specification of reference income is a special case of A5 with φ1 = t/ [tf + s]
and φ2 = t [ωb− Y ] / [ft+ s]. Yaniv’s model is not, however, encompassed by the TBM for,
in forming the taxpayer’s objective function, the author adopts the segregation assumption
of the original 1979 version of PT, according to which certain gains and losses are extracted
from the gamble. The coding phase (in which the original version of PT held segregation
to occur), is, however, de-emphasised in the later cumulative version of PT – the version we
employ. Accordingly, the remaining literature on PT and tax evasion, all of which post-dates
Yaniv’s contribution, does not adopt this assumption. Does Yaniv’s model still reverse the
Yitzhaki puzzle if segregation is not assumed? In part (v) of Proposition 1 we give a result
that addresses this question, and answers it in the negative: for Yaniv’s specification of R
we obtain εφ2,t = −1 yet, by part (v), a necessary (and still not sufficient) condition for the
Yitzhaki puzzle to be overturned is εφ2,t > −tf/ [tf + s] ≥ −1.
The last contribution to the literature we discuss here is that of Bernasconi and Zanardi
(2004). Unlike the rest of the literature, this study does not explicitly specify reference
income, but rather it examines taxpayer behaviour for all possible values of R. Implicitly,
however, the non-specification of R is equivalent to the specification of R as a constant,
R = c. Viewed this way, the Bernasconi and Zanardi specification of R is the special case of
A5 with φ1 = t/ [ft+ s] and φ2 = [Y [1− t]− c] / [ft+ s]. As this specification of reference
income implies Rt = 0 the RD-effect does not arise, leaving only a pure DS-effect. Hence,
under the PT variant, ∂X/∂t < 0. The contribution of Proposition 1 in respect of this
analysis is to highlight that, once an endogenous specification for R is adopted, PT and its
variants may no longer reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle. As the authors note in their conclusion,
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pinning-down reference income is unavoidable if PT is to yield clear and testable predictions.
We complete our discussion of Proposition 1 by assessing its implications for the separate
elements of the TBM. The proposition makes clear that the Yitzhaki puzzle can be resolved
without recourse to either probability weighting or loss aversion, and part (i) makes clear
that when EUT is augmented with probability weighting and/or loss aversion the Puzzle is
unaffected. These two features of PT are therefore unimportant with respect to the predicted
sign of ∂X/∂t.12 Diminishing sensitivity, too, is neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve the
Puzzle. Indeed, in the presence of social stigma, diminishing sensitivity appears to hinder
the resolution of the Puzzle. To see this, note from part (iv) of Proposition 1 that, close to
the maximum level of social stigma, the necessary condition for the Puzzle to be resolved is
weaker under RD than under PT. Thus reference dependence stands out as the only feature
of PT that is essential to resolving the Puzzle.
3.2 Endogenous Audit Probability
In practice only a fairly small proportion of tax authority audits are selected randomly. Ac-
cordingly, here we repeat the analysis conducted in the previous section under an alternative
assumption to that of A7:
A8. p′ < 0.
Under A8, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) prove (their Proposition 1c) that if the only as-
sumptions made with regard to preferences are A0, A2 and A3, then the sign of ∂X/∂t under
EUT is ambiguous. To obtain comparative static results under A8, therefore, we require a
stronger restriction on preferences. Homogeneous utility appears of particular relevance
in this context as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) original value function – subsequently
axiomatised under PT by al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) – is piecewise homogeneous. Accordingly,
we assume
A9. xu′ (x) =
{
βu (x) if x ≥ 0;
γu (x) otherwise;
which is equivalent to the statement that u (x) is homogeneous of degree β in the gain
domain, and of degree γ in the loss domain.13 For A9 to be compatible with A2 we require
β ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 1.
12Consistent with our finding regarding probability weighting, Eide (2001) shows that introducing (rank-
dependent) probability weighting into the standard tax evasion model does not qualitatively change the
comparative statics results.
13An example u (x) that satisfies A0-A4 is given by the piecewise function u (x) = axβ for x ≥ 0 and
u (x) = ax1/β for x < 0, where a > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1).
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Whereas, when p′ = 0, φ1 ∈ (0, 1) was guaranteed by Lemma 2, under A8 interior maxima
satisfying φ1 > 1 can exist. This is readily observed from the first order condition in equation
(4), where the final term is positive when p′ < 0. We now show, however, that under the
stronger preference restriction in A9 φ1 ∈ (0, 1) must hold at an interior maximum when
φ2 = 0.
Lemma 4 Under A0-A6 and A8-A9, and assuming φ2 = 0, at any interior maximum of
(3), it must hold that φ1 ∈ (0, 1).
Given Lemma 4 it is straightforward to verify that φ2 = 0 remains necessary and sufficient
for ∆Y c < 0 < ∆Y n to hold at any interior maximum.
Proposition 2 If assumptions A0-A6 and A8-A9 hold then, at an interior maximum,
(i) under both EUT and LA∧PW ∂X
∂t
≥ 0 for s sufficiently close to (or equal to) zero, and
∂X
∂t
< 0 for s sufficiently close to s;
(ii) under PT ∂X
∂t
R 0⇔ φ1t Q 0;
(iii) under RD ∂X
∂t
R 0⇔ φ1t Q f [γ−β]φ1[φ1−1][tf+s][γφ1−β[φ1−1]] < 0.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 extends the original statement of the Yitzhaki puzzle to the case
of variable audit probability and homogeneous utility (as well as allowing for loss aversion,
probability weighting, and sufficiently low levels of stigma). Introducing variable audit
probabilities does not, therefore, appear to enhance importantly the descriptive abilities
of EUT with respect to the Puzzle. Under PT, the income and substitution effects cancel,
leaving a residual that takes the sign of −φ1t. A simple necessary and sufficient condition
for the Yitzhaki puzzle to be resolved therefore holds: φ1t > 0. In the absence of stigma,
all three of the specifications of reference income satisfying R ∈ (Y c, Y n) in the existing
literature fail to satisfy this necessary condition. Moreover, it is straightforward to show
(with the same procedure we use to prove Lemma 3) that when φ1t > 0 it holds that both
d [E (∆Y )] /dt and d [∆Y n] /dt are positive, so whenever the Puzzle is resolved under PT it
also predicts that expected relative wealth increases following a tax rate rise. Thus, allowing
for variable audit probabilities does not appear to enhance the descriptive abilities of PT
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and its variants with respect to the Puzzle either. Once again, the condition for the RD
variant to overturn the Yitzhaki puzzle is strictly weaker than that for PT.
The effects of stigma are similar to those in the analysis with fixed probabilities. In
particular, in the presence of stigma, the specification of reference income as the legal post-
tax income satisfies the necessary condition for Yitzhaki’s puzzle to be resolved, but the
predictions regarding ∂X/∂t of the PT and RD variants for the remaining two specifications
of reference income satisfying R ∈ (Y c, Y n) are either unchanged with stigma, or worsen
with stigma.
What are the implications of Proposition 2 for the existing literature? The model of
Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 2, where it corresponds
to a special case of the PT variant with R = Y [1− t]. Our insights with respect to this
contribution are two-fold. First, while these authors demonstrate, in this special case, that
PT outperforms EUT, we can assess whether PT has a general advantage over EUT in
relation to predicting the sign of ∂X/∂t. Concerning this question, Proposition 2 does not
suggest that PT has such an advantage.14 Second, the specification of the model implies
that taxpayers who are made poorer in absolute terms by a tax rate rise will feel relatively
richer.
4 Conclusion
Prospect theory (PT) is widely viewed as the best available description of how (many)
people behave in risky settings, and we do not dissent from this view. Barberis (2013) notes,
however, that PT is not always straightforward to apply: in particular, the most appropriate
specification of the reference level is often unclear.15 Yet, we show that theoretical predictions
related to tax evasion and the Yitzhaki puzzle depend crucially on the specification of that
reference level.
We focus on tax evasion and in particular on the Yitzhaki puzzle: the EUT model of tax
evasion predicts a decrease in tax evasion when the tax rate increases (∂X/∂t < 0). The
14We have shown (Table 1) that the specification of reference income in Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007)
corresponds to a convex combination of Y c and Y n with a weight on Y c of α = φ1 = t/ [ft+ s]. A possible
confusion in evaluating Dhami and al-Nowaihi’s result, which our analysis enables us to clarify, is that these
authors assert this specification to be the only one with the property R ∈ (Y c, Y n). We show, however, that
this specification is just one special case of a wider set of specifications with this property. In particular,
any specification of reference income as a (strictly) convex combination of Y c and Y n must also satisfy this
property (Lemma 2).
15The specification of the value and weighting functions of PT may also be problematic (see, e.g., Neilson
and Stowe, 2002; Sadiraj, 2014).
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PT literature provides several specific examples in which the Puzzle is solved: our research
is a first step towards understanding, in a general setting, the conditions under which PT
reverses the Puzzle. Furthermore, by stripping down the elements of PT, we are able to
(i) identify the forces that drive predictions concerning the impact of the tax rate on tax
evasion; and (ii) to compare our findings with those under Expected Utility Theory (EUT).
Although our findings do not clearly endorse the descriptive validity of EUT, we find that,
in respect of the Puzzle, many specifications of PT share similar descriptive deficiencies.
Interestingly, the set of specifications of PT that cannot reverse the Puzzle overlaps with
many of those advocated in the literature. The auxiliary assumptions we consider – social
stigma and variable audit probability – allow PT in some cases to reverse the Yitzhaki puzzle,
but when they do so, they also allow the model under EUT to do likewise when similarly
augmented. Although there are indeed many specifications of PT that do reverse the Puzzle,
we find that in many instances these specifications imply that taxpayers will feel richer after
a tax rise, for they imply that reference income falls (and by a sufficient amount) following
a tax rate increase. That taxpayers made objectively poorer by a tax rate rise would feel
subjectively richer seems psychologically questionable, albeit empirical work addressing this
point is needed. Thus, Barberis’s point concerning the difficulty of properly identifying the
reference level is evident in the tax evasion context.
Our findings contribute to the literature on the individual elements of PT. Of the four
elements of PT that we isolate, only reference dependence is necessary to resolve the Puzzle,
which is in agreement with its supposed status as the most accepted of all the elements of PT.
Loss aversion and probability weighting are largely irrelevant for the sign of ∂X/∂t. Invoking
Occam’s razor, we believe that some of the findings relating to the Yitzhaki puzzle that have
been attributed to PT may more properly be interpreted as being attributable to simpler
reference-dependent models that contain only a subset of the elements of PT. Perhaps more
surprisingly, diminishing sensitivity is neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve the Yitzhaki
puzzle, and indeed pushes ∂X/∂t the “wrong” way in the presence of social stigma.
Given the importance of PT in explaining behaviour in so many economic domains, it
seems altogether likely that it is also of importance in explaining behaviour towards tax
evasion too. As such, our cautionary findings need not imply that tax evasion researchers
should cease to explore the insights of PT, but they do suggest that renewed focus must be
placed on the specification of reference income and preferences. In particular, if researchers
wish to retain the common assumption of homogeneous preferences then specifications of
reference income beyond those encompassed by our model must be sought, for otherwise
17
taxpayers must feel subjectively richer after a tax rate rise for PT to reverse the Puzzle.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Under A6 the first derivative in (4) is decreasing, and when an
interior maximum exists it must also switch sign on (0, Y ). Hence limX↓0 ∂V/∂X ≥ 0 and
limX↑Y ∂V/∂X ≤ 0. Taking the limit of (4) asX ↑ Y , and noting that limX↑Y {v (∆Y n)− v (∆Y c)} =
0 by A1, the latter inequality in the preceding sentence implies
φ1 ≥ lim
X↑Y
w (p (Y )) v′ (∆Y c)
[1− w (p (Y ))] v′ (∆Y n) + w (p (Y )) v′ (∆Y c) .
Using (1) this may be re-written as
φ1 ≥
{
limX↑Y
λw(p(X))
1−w(p(X))+λw(p(X)) if φ2 = 0;
limX↑Y w (p (X)) otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Suppose, by way of contradiction, φ1 ≥ 1 then the first derivative
in (4) with p′ = 0 is always negative, thus ruling out the possibility of an interior maximum.
Hence φ1 < 1 at an interior maximum. Next, the proof of Lemma 1 establishes that either
φ1 ≥ limX↑Y w (p (X)) > 0 or
φ1 ≥ lim
X↑Y
λw (p (X))
1− w (p (X)) + λw (p (X)) ≥ w (p (X)) > 0.
Hence φ1 > 0.
(ii) We first show that φ2 = 0 implies that Y
c < R < Y n. Equation (2) becomes R =
φ1Y
c + [1− φ1]Y n. By Lemma 2, φ1 ∈ (0, 1), hence R is a convex combination of Y n
and Y c.
We now show that Y c < R < Y n for all X ∈ (0, Y ) implies φ2 = 0. ∆Y n > 0 > ∆Y c
holds for all X ∈ (0, Y ). At X = Y , however, it holds that Y n = Y c = Y [1− t], so
∆Y n = ∆Y c = 0. Therefore, as R ∈ [Y n, Y c] arbitrarily close to X = Y , by continuity,
we must have R = Y n = Y c = Y [1− t] at X = Y . However, when X = Y , equation (2)
gives R = Y [1− t] − [ft+ s]φ2, which is consistent with R = Y [1− t] also holding only if
[ft+ s]φ2 = 0, hence φ2 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. We start by proving statement (i). Under the parameter
restrictions defining LA ∧ PW the derivative ∂X/∂t, found implicitly from (4), is
∂X
∂t
= − 1
D
[[1− w (p)] tXv′′ (Y n)− w (p) {t [f − 1] + s} [X + f [Y −X]] v′′ (Y c)
+ w (p) [f − 1] v′ (Y c)− [1− w (p)] v′ (Y n)].
Substituting from the first-order condition we obtain
∂X
∂t
= − 1
D
{[1− w (p)] tv′ (Y n) [Y [A (Y c)− A (Y n)] + [Y −X] [A (Y n) + [f − 1]A (Y c)]]
− w (p) s
t
v′ (Y c)}.
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If s = 0 this rewrites as
∂X
∂t
=
1
t
[
[Y −X] + Y [A (Y
c)− A (Y n)]
[f − 1]A (Y c) + A (Y n)
]
. (A.1)
Under A4, A (Y c) − A (Y n) ≥ 0, hence ∂X/∂t > 0. As equation (A.1) holds for w (p) = p,
and is independent of λ, ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 also holds under EUT. If s ↑ s¯ then X ↑ Y and
A (Y c) ↓ A (Y n) so
∂X
∂t
= lim
s↑s¯
w (p) s
tD
v′ (Y c) < 0.
(ii-iv). Under the relevant parameter restrictions the derivative ∂X/∂t, found implicitly from
the first order condition, is
∂X
∂t
=
[ft+ s]
D
×
 φ1t [w (p) v′ (∆Y c) + [1− w (p)] v′ (∆Y n)]
+ [Y −X]
[
w (p) [φ1 − 1] [f [φ1 − 1] + φ1t [ft+ s]] v′′ (∆Y c)
+φ1 [1− w (p)] [fφ1 + φ1t [ft+ s]] v′′ (∆Y n)
]  .
After some algebra and using the first order condition to simplify the equation, we obtain:
∂X
∂t
=
f [Y −X]
ft+ s
+
[ft+ s]φ1t
D
[
1
φ1
[w (p) v′ (∆Y c)] (A.2)
+φ1 [ft+ s] [Y −X] [1− w (p)] v′ (∆Y n) [A (∆Y c)− A (∆Y n)]] .
Equation (A.2) allows us to prove parts (ii) to (iv). Notice that the first term in (A.2) is
always positive. The second term is all multiplied by φ1t. This is sufficient to prove statement
(iv). Indeed, when φ1t = 0, then the second term disappears and ∂X/∂t ≥ 0. By continuity,
this result must also hold in a neighbourhood of 0.
Under RD, A (∆Y c) − A (∆Y n) ≥ 0, so the sign of the second term in (A.2) is that of
−φ1t. Define Φ(ii) as the value of φ1t such that ∂X/∂t = 0. Then,
Φ(ii) = −f [Y −X]D
[ft+ s]2
×
[
w (p) v′ (∆Y c)
φ1
+ φ1 [ft+ s] [Y −X] [1− w (p)] v′ (∆Y n) [A (∆Y c)− A (∆Y n)]
]−1
.
Notice that Φ(ii) > 0. Statement (ii) follows immediately.
To prove part (iii) notice that A (∆Y c)−A (∆Y n) < 0 under PT. Then, although Φ(iii) is
written identically to Φ(ii), its sign is no longer determined. If the term in square brackets is
positive, it follows that ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 if φ1t ≤ Φ(iii) and ∂X/∂t < 0 if φ1t > Φ(iii). However, if
the term in brackets is negative, then ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 if φ1t > Φ(iii) and ∂X/∂t < 0 if φ1t < Φ(iii).
Finally, notice that the term in square brackets is positive if its first (positive) term outweighs
the second. This occurs when φ1 = 0 (and by continuity, in its neighbourhood) and when s
tends to s¯ (for then X tends to Y and [A (∆Y c)− A (∆Y n)] tends to zero).
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(v) Under the relevant parameter restrictions, the derivative ∂X/∂t is
∂X
∂t
=
ft+ s
D
[[f [[φ1 − 1] [Y −X] + φ2] + [ft+ s]φ2t] [φ1 − 1]w (p) v′′ (∆Y c)
+ [f [φ1 [Y −X] + φ2] + [ft+ s]φ2t]φ1 [1− w (p)] v′′ (∆Y n)] .
Using the first order condition in (4) and replacing εφ2 ≡ t [φ2t/φ2], we obtain
∂X
∂t
=
f [Y −X]
ft+ s
+
φ2
t
[tf + [tf + s] εφ2 ]
A (∆Y c)− A (∆Y n)
[ft+ s] [[φ1 − 1]A (∆Y c)− φ1A (∆Y n)] .
The second order condition in (5) writes as
∂2V
[∂X]2
= [ft+ s]2
[
w (p) [1− φ1]2 v′′ (∆Y c) + [1− w (p)] [φ1]2 v′′ (∆Y n)
]
< 0, (A.3)
hence
[φ1 − 1]A (∆Y c)− φ1A (∆Y n) < 0.
As also A (∆Y c) − A (∆Y n) < 0 (under diminishing sensitivity), a sufficient condition for
∂X/∂t > 0 is therefore εφ2 < −ft/ [ft+ s].
Proof of Lemma 3. We first prove the statements relative to d [E (∆Y )] /dt and then
move on to those relative to d [∆Y n] /dt. From E (∆Y ) = [ft+ s] [Y −X] [φ1 − w (p)] we
compute
dE (∆Y )
dt
= f [Y −X] [φ1 − w (p)]− [ft+ s]Xt [φ1 − w (p)] + [ft+ s] [Y −X]φ1t
= [φ1 − w (p)] [ft+ s]
[
f [Y −X]
[ft+ s]
−Xt
]
+ [ft+ s] [Y −X]φ1t.
Replacing Xt by its expression, we obtain dE (∆Y ) /dt = Ωφ1t with
Ω ≡ −1
[φ1 − 1]A (∆Y c)− φ1A (∆Y n)
×
[
[Y −X] [ft+ s]
[
[1− w (p)]A (∆Y c)
+w (p)A (∆Y n)
]
+
[φ1 − w (p)] [pv′ (∆Y c)]
[1− p] [φ1]2 v′ (∆Y n)
]
.
Studying the sign of Ω, by the second order condition in (A.3), the initial fraction is positive.
Within the main square bracket, the first term is positive under RD while the second term
is always positive, for φ1 > w (p) by Lemma 2. This proves that under RD d [E (∆Y )] /dt R
0 ⇔ φ1t R 0. Under PT, the first term in brackets may take negative values. However, for
s = s (and, by continuity, in its neighbourhood), then Y = X and the first term in square
bracket is zero. This proves that for s sufficiently close to s, d [E (∆Y )] /dt R 0⇔ φ1t R 0.
Moving to ∆Y n, from ∆Y n = φ1 [ft+ s] [Y −X] we compute
d [∆Y n]
∂t
= [fφ1 + [tf + s]φ1t] [Y −X]− φ1 [ft+ s]Xt
= [ft+ s]
[
[Y −X]
[
1− [ft+s]2[φ1]2[1−w(p)]v′(∆Y n)[A(∆Y c)−A(∆Y n)]
D
]
− [ft+s]
D
[w (p) v′ (∆Y c)]
]
φ1t.
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Under RD, A (∆Y c) − A (∆Y n) > 0, hence, all the terms in the bracket are positive. This
directly implies that d [∆Y n] /dt R 0 ⇔ φ1t R 0. Instead, under PT we have A (∆Y c) −
A (∆Y n) < 0. However, for s = s (and, by continuity, in its neighbourhood), then Y = X
and the first term in square bracket is zero: ∂d [∆Y n] /∂t = − [ft+s]2
D
[pv′ (∆Y c)]φ1t. This
proves that for s sufficiently close to s, d [∆Y n] /dt R 0⇔ φ1t R 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. Setting φ2 = 0 the taxpayer’s objective function can be written as
V = w (p) [[tf + s] [Y −X]]β1−DSγDS v (φ1 − 1)+[1− w (p)] [tf + s]β [Y −X]β v (φ1) . (A.4)
Thus, ∂V/∂X is found as
− [tf + s]β1−DSγDS [Y −X]β1−DSγDS−1
[ [
β1−DSγDSw (p)− [Y −X]w′p′] v (φ1 − 1)
+
[
β1−DSγDS [1− w (p)] + [Y −X]w′p′] v (φ1)
]
.
If φ1 ≥ 1 then ∂V/∂X < 0 and if φ1 ≤ 0 then ∂V/∂X > 0. In either case there cannot be
an interior maximum. Hence, at an interior maximum φ1 ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Under LA ∧ PW the first-order condition is written, using
A9, as
∂V
∂X
= w (p) {t [f − 1] + s} v′ (Y c)− [1− w (p)] tv′ (Y n) + w′p′ [v (Y c)− v (Y n)] = 0. (A.5)
Thus ∂X/∂t is found as
∂X
∂t
= − 1
βD

[βw (p) [f − 1]− w′p′ [X + f [Y −X]]] v′ (Y c)
− [β [1− w (p)]− w′p′X] v′ (Y n)
− [βw (p) {t [f − 1] + s}+ w′p′Y c] [X + f [Y −X]] v′′ (Y c)
+ [βt [1− w (p)] + w′p′Y n]Xv′′ (Y n)
 .
If s = 0, and noting that A (Y i) = [1− β] /Y i, i = c, n, ∂X/∂t reduces to
∂X
∂t
= − Y
βtD
{
w′p′
[
v′ (Y n)− v′ (Y c) + [1− β] [Y n−Y c
Y n
]
v′ (Y c)
]
+βtw (p) [f − 1] [1− β] [Y n−Y c
Y nY c
]
v′ (Y c)
}
. (A.6)
Now note that from the first-order condition and A9 we have
βtw (p) [f − 1] + w′p′Y c
βt [1− w (p)] + w′p′Y n =
v′ (Y n)
v′ (Y c)
=
[
Y c
Y n
]1−β
.
Then, defining φ (z) = z1−β, the first-order Taylor series expansion of φ (z) at z = 1 is
g (z) = 1− [1− β] [1− z]. Clearly, g(z) ≥ φ (z) for all z and g(z) > z1−β for all z 6= 1, so
v′ (Y n)
v′ (Y c)
< g
(
Y c
Y n
)
= 1− [1− β]
[
Y n − Y c
Y n
]
.
Rearranging, we obtain
v′ (Y n)− v′ (Y c) + [1− β]
[
Y n − Y c
Y n
]
v′ (Y c) < 0, (A.7)
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which signs (A.6) positive. As equation (A.6) holds for w (p) = p, and it is independent
of λ, ∂X/∂t ≥ 0 also holds under EUT. If s ↑ s¯ then ∂X/∂t instead writes as
∂X
∂t
= lim
s↑s¯
w (p) s
tD
v′ (Y c) < 0.
(ii)-(iii) Setting φ2 = 0 the taxpayer’s objective function is given by (A.4). Using the first
order condition, we obtain
∂X
∂t
=
[tf + s]β
1−DSγDS [Y −X]β1−DSγDS−1
D
× [β1−DSγDSw (p)− [Y −X]w′p′] v (φ1 − 1)
×
[
f
[
β1−DSγDS − β]+ φ1t [ft+ s] β1−DSγDSφ1 − β [φ1 − 1]
φ1 [φ1 − 1]
]
.
Under PT (DS = 1) we, therefore, obtain
∂X
∂t
=
[tf + s]β [Y −X]β−1
φ1D
φ1t [βw (p)− [Y −X]w′p′] v (φ1 − 1) , (A.8)
which takes the sign of −φ1t. Under RD (DS = 0) we obtain
∂X
∂t
T 0⇔ φ1t S f [γ − β]φ1 [φ1 − 1]
[tf + s] [γφ1 − β [φ1 − 1]] < 0.
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